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ABSTRACT
As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws
in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may
be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm
violates  the  principle  of  democratic  accountability.  Because  important  differences  exist  in
policymaking authority, instruments, and goals, banking supervisors need to improve their ability
to monitor and mitigate the consequences of defects in one another's performance. A straightforward
way to enhance both capacities would be to establish opportunities for public trading in debt
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CAN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFFORD TO RESIST THE NEED FOR MORE ACCOUNTABLE SAFETY- 
NET MANAGEMENT?
* 
Edward J. Kane 
Boston College 
 
  Financial-institution supervision combines a capacity to observe fluctuations in balance-
sheet values (“vision”) with a capacity to influence managerial actions (“control”) and an 
incentive system that governs the pursuit and exercise of these capacities.  Even when portfolios 
and attendant risks are concentrated within a single country, it is difficult to establish a 
combination of adequate oversight of institutional balance sheets, adequate authority to intervene 
in timely fashion, and bureaucratic incentives to detect and resolve insolvent institutions in ways 
that adequately protect taxpayer interests.  As a result, individual countries solve this contracting 
problem in different ways. 
Sincere efforts to integrate the financial markets of individual countries must also 
integrate national safety nets. Safety nets are instruments for preventing and resolving financial 
crises.  Crisis prevention and crisis management entail a right to take over insolvent financial 
institutions. Efforts to assess the viability of troubled institutions and to assign fair values to 
stakeholder claims against failing firms are rife with incentive conflict.   
As European institutions and markets book more and more cross-border business, the 
potential for conflict grows.  This is because some or all of the bill for one country’s regulatory 
mistakes or gambles can be presented to citizens of other countries. Gaps in the jurisdiction of 
national regulators and supervisors can break the link between efforts to control bank and 
nonbank risk-taking and the allocation of losses that taxpayers might accrue in financial-
institution failures. 
                                                 
* This paper extends and refocuses analysis first presented in Kane (2003) and (2005).  The author wishes to thank 
Richard C. Aspinwall, Bill Bergman, and Mark Flannery for helpful criticisms of an earlier draft. December 5, 2005 
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    To keep the discussion concrete, this paper focuses on potential cross-country 
abuse of nation-based systems of explicit deposit insurance.  However, it should be understood 
that this is merely the tip of a global safety-net iceberg and that past abuses of the U.S. safety net 
have exploited accountability breakdowns that extend de facto forms of safety-net support for 
institutions and instruments that reach far beyond the limits of de jure coverages. The major 
problem of modern financial regulation is to restore economic logic to the de jure and de facto 
coverage of country safety nets. In the U.S., claims on banks that are not deposits and claims on 
instutions that are not banks (e.g., government-sponsored enterprises, mutual funds, and even 
hedge funds) have managed to extract de facto safety-net support.  
The social norms on which the regulatory systems of European countries are built 
typically weaken regulators’ capacity and incentives to intervene strongly and promptly at 
systemically important banks. Differences in these norms make the effort to coordinate vision, 
control, and incentives across countries an especially thorny problem.  Cross-border activity 
expands opportunities for insolvent banks (and incentive-conflicted government officials) to hide 
losses and concentrations in risk exposure from supervisors in home and/or host countries.  To 
lessen this danger, information-sharing arrangements between national regulatory bodies have 
been expanding as well, but unfortunately at a much slower pace (Dermine, 2003; Garcia and 
Nieto, 2005; Schoenmaker and Osterloo, 2004; Schüler, 2003).   
But being able to monitor bank risk exposures is only part of the cross-border 
coordination problem. Differences in regulatory authority, instruments, and goals must also be 
reconciled and imbedded into a cross-border architecture of democratic accountability. Cross-
border accountability and emergency tax-collecting capacity mean that whoever manages a 
multinational safety net must be accountable to the taxpayers of whatever countries supply the December 5, 2005 
4 
risk capital safety-net managers can call upon to bail out insolvent institutions in catastrophic 
circumstances. Because nation-based regulators focus primarily on effects that fall on their own 
citizens, the costs of banking insolvency in one country could easily spill over onto the accounts 
of taxpayers in partner countries (Vives, 2001).  Moreover, gaps in information flows and 
jurisdiction delay resolution activity and increase the effective burdens of proof that individual-
country supervisors must meet before they can take needed loss-control actions.   
In the EU, cross-country supervision does not entail cross-country insurance. For this 
reason, the lead-regulator model -- in which home-country regulators examine multinational 
conglomerates and host-country regulators rely on the results – ignores the principle of 
democratic accountability. To perform the duties they owe their citizens, supervisors in different 
countries must be able both to monitor and to discipline one another’s supervisory and regulatory 
activity.  
  This paper begins by explaining why it is hard to resist, at least as a working hypothesis, 
the proposition that for the foreseeable future only painful crisis experience—and not the logical 
force of abstract economic argument—could convince national authorities to cede sufficient tax 
and regulatory authority to Brussels to permit the construction of an incentive-compatible 
PanEuropean crisis-prevention and crisis-management agency.  The existence of impediments to 
efficient contracting implies that national banking supervisors would be wise to improve their 
ability at least to monitor and to respond to differences in the quality of one another’s work.  The 
paper goes on to argue that this could be accomplished by asking individual-country 
governments and the multinational bodies to encourage all countries to issue tradable country-
level deposit-insurance agency debt and reinsurance contracts. 
 December 5, 2005 
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I.  Patterns of Jurisdictional Conflict in U.S. History 
  Regulation is re-regulation. Both within and across countries, regulatory arrangements 
evolve in a dialectical fashion (Kane, 1981). Reforms almost never obliterate pre-existing 
systems; they amend them at the margin either to lighten perceived burdens or to narrow 
disruptive loopholes.  
  The difficulty of moving from a system of independent national regulators to one in 
which cross-jurisdictional interdependence is efficiently and fairly recognized increases 
nonlinearly with the number of jurisdictions that must be unified. The antagonism observed 
between proponents of national and supranational banking supervision in Europe today has many 
parallels in U.S. history.  The United States has experienced more than 200 years of conflict 
between proponents of state and cross-state (i.e., federal) supervision of its banking system.  
Initially, state supervisors had the upper hand and markedly extended their power when President 
Andrew Jackson refused to renew the charter of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836. 
For the next 25 years, supervisory authority over U.S. banks was exercised wholly by the 
individual states.  However, once a national chartering authority was re-established, jurisdiction 
began to move slowly and inexorably from the periphery toward the center.  The “single 
passport”—which enables institutions chartered by any one member country both to relocate 
their headquarters and to operate through branch offices throughout the EU—promises to trigger 
a similarly slow jurisdictional adjustment. 
  In any union, the dialectical struggle between joint and individual interests is endless.  
Increased centralization does not and cannot eliminate the conflicts generated at the periphery.  It 
merely confronts and resolves the conflicts in a different way (Eisenbeis and Wall, 2004).  This 
is why geographic limits on the scope of U.S. banking institutions and federal regulatory December 5, 2005 
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jurisdiction have yet to attain a stationary equilibrium.  Each successive round of adjustment 
generates a new round of regulation-induced substitute institutional forms and a new set of 
safety-net stresses. 
  In debating whether to increase or decrease the degree of centralization in any regulatory 
system, the opposing sides lay claim to different benefits and routinely exaggerate the costs of 
the opposing approach.  Proponents of decentralization (i.e., states rights) extol the virtues of 
subsidiarization and regulatory competition and trivialize the burdens of bureaucratic 
duplication.  On the other side, proponents of centralization envision outsized benefits from 
harmonizing and streamlining regulator-bank interfaces and avoiding regulatory duplication, 
while demonizing regulatory competition as a destructive “race to the bottom.” 
  This dialectical tension sustains a political and economic competition for jurisdiction 
within and across countries.  Jurisdictional competition creates and holds open regulatory gaps 
and loopholes that banks and competing financial institutions repeatedly turn to their advantage.  
The regional structure of the Federal Reserve System, the voluntary character of System 
membership for state-chartered banks, and the preservation of individual-state authority to 
charter, examine, and close state-licensed institutions underscore the permanence of this 
competition.   
  Differences in disciplinary powers and enforcement schemes open “loophole” 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and regulated institutions’ lobbying activity encourages 
jurisdictional competition that leads to incentive-conflicted politicians and regulators to tolerate 
or widen these loopholes.  To offset these measures, it is necessary for taxpayers to be able to 
monitor the performance of top regulators and to hold them accountable for the quality of their 
work.  December 5, 2005 
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  As long as defects in accountability allow officials to shift losses to taxpayers in ways 
that in the short run are virtually invisible to outsiders, government-financed deposit-insurance 
schemes are particularly vulnerable to political pressure to subsidize enterprises whose capital is 
too small for the risks they have assumed (Demirgüç and Kane, 2003).  In his study of 14 state-
level deposit-insurance experiments that preceded the creation of federal deposit insurance, 
Calomiris (1990, 1992a and b) makes it clear that the only three schemes that forbearance 
pressures did not bankrupt were ones that were privately managed and strongly incentivized to 
enforce the principle of unlimited mutual liability.  More recently, when accelerating inflation 
drove interest rates to stratospheric levels during the 1970s and 1980s, jurisdictional competition 
and weaknesses in accountability for deposit-insurance losses led federal officials (and their 
counterparts in several states) to suppress critical information, grant regulatory forbearances, and 
extend new risk-taking opportunities to savings institutions  and insolvent large banks (Kane, 
1989).  Interestingly, in the face of the same economic shocks, differently incentivized managers 
of the federal credit-union insurance system protected taxpayers from losses by enforcing the 
unlimited mutual liability for losses that had been built into their scheme (Kane and Hendershott, 
1996). 
 
II. Country-Specific Regulatory Cultures and the Difficulty of Coordinating Them 
  Government chartering and supervision of banks and payments systems are near-
universal phenomena.  Regulatory activities may be described as efforts by a trusted Third Party 
to intervene in the shaping, pricing, and delivery of banking products in one of three ways: by 
rule-making (e.g., capital requirements); by monitoring and enforcement; or by identifying and 
resolving insolvencies (i.e., shortages in bank-contributed net worth). December 5, 2005 
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  The 1975 Basel Concordat and subsequent elaborations assign responsibility for 
consolidated supervision of multinational banking organizations to their home countries, but call 
for contact and cooperation between host and parent supervisory authorities.  In the absence of 
harmonizing dialogue and cooperation, contractual arrangements tie banking regulators in each 
country to strictly domestic interests. Existing channels of democratic accountability encourage 
them to design and operate regulatory enterprises to maximize the politically weighted welfare of 
their fellow citizens.  To enforce a home-country regulator’s concern for the welfare of host 
countries in crisis circumstances, it must be made answerable to host-country citizens. 
  In banking, depositors and other outside stakeholders may be exposed to loss from fraud, 
leverage, or earnings volatility without being adequately informed or compensated for the risks 
entailed.  To reduce their exposure to opportunistic behavior, a bank’s counterparties typically: 
(1) require the bank to bond itself in various ways to behave honestly and fairly; (2) negotiate a 
deterrent right to punish offensive behavior; and (3) monitor information on the bank’s ongoing 
performance and condition.  Bonding, policing, and monitoring are not costless.  The costs vary 
inversely with the transparency (T) provided by the accounting and disclosure regime under 
which the bank operates.  But policing costs are also a function of outside stakeholders’ ability to 
appreciate the implications of the information they receive and their ability to coordinate 
deterrent and punitive responses with others. 
  A principal goal of prudential regulation is to protect society from weaknesses in self-
discipline and market discipline that might otherwise encourage excessive risk-taking and capital 
shortages at individual banks.  Unconflicted policymakers would seek to remedy weaknesses in 
transparency, bank bonding and depositor deterrency by developing policies for preventing, 
detecting, and resolving bank insolvencies that would maximize social welfare.  Mishan (1969) December 5, 2005 
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stipulates that optimal decisions in any policy endeavor produce outcomes that are 
simultaneously Pareto-efficient and “distributionally preferred” (i.e., they help the representative 
citizen and avoid antiegalitarian redistributions of income).  Because crisis-prevention and 
resolution policies redistribute wealth, economists need to adopt some version of the Mishan 
criterion before they can fully assess the efficiency of coordinated efforts to prevent and resolve 
bank insolvencies. 
  As stewards of taxpayer resources, this criterion implies that financial regulators owe 
four duties to the representative taxpayer:  
1. Vision (maintaining a capacity to recognize risk-taking and capital shortages in timely 
fashion); 
2. Prompt corrective action (being committed to control the value of implicit and explicit 
government guarantees); 
3. Least-cost resolution (efficiently curing insolvencies that corrective action fails to 
avert);  
4. Truth-telling (keeping taxpayers informed about the true opportunity costs of 
regulatory strategies). 
  Gaps in vision and reporting obligations undermine the effectiveness of both insolvency 
prevention and crisis resolution.  They strengthen short-run political and careerist pressures that 
tempt top supervisors and regulators to avoid harsh criticism by not closely enforcing economic 
insolvency. 
  It is, of course, easier to integrate the private banking markets of any group of countries 
(i = 1, . . ., n) than to integrate their private and governmental systems of banking regulation.  
Regulatory integration is complicated because, even if regulatory strategies and control December 5, 2005 
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structures (Ri) did not differ greatly between the countries, individual-country regulators are 
responsible to different sets of taxpayers (Ti) and applicable legislation makes private and 
governmental regulatory officials accountable to their citizens in disparate contractual ways (Ci). 
  When third-party guarantees don’t exist or lose credibility, private markets force banks 
known to be experiencing opportunity-cost losses to adjust their affairs promptly.  Troubled 
banks must do one or all of three things: shrink their footings, raise more capital, or pay higher 
interest rates on their deposits and other debt. 
  In monitoring, disciplining, and resolving banks, the incentives of government officials to 
act promptly differ from those of private creditors in important ways.  Officials cannot focus 
only on the projected economic costs and benefits of the intervention; they must also estimate 
outside political responses to their interventions.  This is important because official interventions 
usually generate more publicity than private ones.  Savvy government regulators must be alert to 
how even small interventions might damage their professional reputations and careers if their 
policies greatly distress powerful parties.  
  Although many commonalities of interest exist, governmental systems for setting and 
enforcing financial rules are infested with incentive conflict.  Even within a country, major 
conflicts exist between and among: 
1.  Regulators and the firms they regulate; 
2.  Particular regulators and other societal watchdogs; 
3.  Regulators and the politicians to whom they must report; 
4.  Taxpayers and the politicians and regulators they put in office. 
  How a country traditionally approaches and resolves these conflicts is in part hard-wired 
into its political and institutional structure.  For example, while many EU countries supervise December 5, 2005 
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banks separately from other financial institutions, some do not.  A few European countries 
(Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, in particular) have established 
agencies that supervise bank and nonbank financial institutions in an integrated way; others have 
to some degree integrated the oversight of at least their bank and securities sectors (Schüler, 
2003). 
  Every country relies on regulators and other professional watchdogs to bridge gaps in the 
bonding, deterrent rights (deterrency), and transparency inherent in its private contracting 
environment.  Over time, the interaction of private and government watchdogs generates a 
regulatory culture.  A culture may be defined as customs, ideas, and attitudes that members of a 
group share and transmit from generation to generation by systems of subtle and unsubtle 
rewards and punishments.  A regulatory culture limits the ways in which an uncooperative or 
even unscrupulous individual bank can be monitored and disciplined.  It comprises a matrix of 
attitudes and beliefs about how regulators should act.  These slowly changing attitudes and 
beliefs often express a distrust of government power that traces back to abuses observed in a 
possibly distant past when the country was occupied, colonized, or run by a one-party 
government.  The culture’s taboos and traditions define standards for the fair use of government 
power.  Behind these standards are higher-order social norms that underlie a nation’s political 
and legal environments. 
  The character of a country’s Regulatory Culture is spanned by six specific components: 
•  Legal authority and reporting obligations 
•  Formulation and promulgation of specific rules 
•  Technology of monitoring for violations & compliance 
•  Allowable penalties for material violations December 5, 2005 
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•  Duties of consultation:  To guarantee fairness, regulated parties enjoy a right to 
procedural due process that specifies burdens of proof that regulators that must meet 
before levying specific penalties 
•  Regulatee rights to judicial review: To bond the fairness guarantee, penalized parties 
have access to inside and outside appeals procedures.   
In large part, the details of each component are shaped by: 
a.  Recognition and response lags generated by the interaction of weakness in the 
transparency of the nation’s accounting system with bureaucratic incentives and 
statutory and bureaucratic checks and balances; 
b.  Regulatory competition brought about by the entry of foreign or differently 
regulated institutions; 
c.  Regulatory personnel’s exposure to influence activity from a discipline-resistant 
firm’s political clout, consultation rights, and appeal privileges; 
d.  Social norms that protect fraudsters and bumblers against prompt regulatory 
discipline. 
  Lobbying activity seeks to reshape the particular objectives that officials pursue and to 
constrain the tradeoffs they make within limits set by a country’s regulatory culture.  How the 
particular policy strategies officials adopt actually work is determined by regulatees’ ability to 
delay or stymie decisive intervention and to find and exploit circumventive loopholes.  Some of 
these loopholes involve the ability to relocate loss exposures that are more closely supervised by 
the home country (or a particular host) to venues that monitor or discipline them less effectively. 
  In the absence of cross-country understandings or agreements, it is reasonable to presume 
that regulators in any individual country A would focus on the politically weighted welfare of its December 5, 2005 
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own citizens.  They would maximize the welfare function, WA(RA; A C ; RZ), with respect to the 
instruments and authority conveyed to them by the regulatory culture of A, taking as given the 
regulatory culture and systems in the vector of other union countries Z (RZ).  Similarly, 
authorities in each other country (Z1, . . ., Zn) would maximize 
i Z W (RZi;  Z C ; RX), taking RX (= 
RA and other Rs) as given.  It is convenient to label the solutions to these uncoordinated 
maximizations as 
*
A W  and 
*
Z W . 
  Assuming that cross-country conflicts are roughly symmetric, it is sufficient to focus on 
the effect of allowing regulators in A to influence RZ.  The simplest case is to designate A as the 
prudential regulator for all of the banks that operate in Z and to allow A to set a single set of 
rules and procedures 
i Z R  = RA= R for all i.  We can label the solution that would emerge after 
this “regulatory centralization” as 
C
A W , where the C stands for “common.”  Whenever the 
common R set by A differs from one or both of the systems
*
A W  and 
*
Z W , the welfare of citizens 
in particular countries change.  In theory, the practical restriction that the centralized regulatory 
regime must be the same in each country, but must respond to at least some distinctive features 
of each financial environment in Z could mean that the centralized regulator might end up 
reducing taxpayer welfare in all countries.  Such possibilities are what make a common scheme 
fiendishly hard both to negotiate in the first place and (until and unless a crisis emerges) only 
slightly easier to renegotiate over time. 
 
III. Similarities and Differences in EU Deposit-Insurance Systems 
  EU deposit-insurance systems show three common features that—according to U.S. 
experience and econometric cross-country research summarized in Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and December 5, 2005 
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Laeven (2005)—undermine a country’s ability to control moral hazard: membership is not 
compulsory; funding for payouts is publicly administered; and guarantees extend to interbank 
deposits.  Both individually and in the aggregate, these features reduce incentives for strong 
institutions to help government supervisors to discipline risk exposures at weak or overly 
aggressive banks. 
  On the other hand, these systems differ in important ways: in age (i.e., seasoning), in 
coverage levels, in the use of coinsurance provisions, in whether they cover balances held in 
foreign-currency accounts, and in the use they make of private managers.  An important 
consequence of home-country supervision is that member countries have had few incentives to 
examine and reconcile undesirable differences in the structure of their deposit-insurance systems. 
  Table 1 shows how widely EU deposit-insurance systems vary in seasoning and in their 
strategies for limiting their exposure to loss.  Only about half of the countries impose 
coinsurance obligations on depositors. Although an EU Directive establishes a minimum 
coverage of 20,000 euros, member states are free to set higher levels of compensation. Variation 
in the ratio of maximum coverage to per capita GDP (pcgdp) ranges from 40 percent in 
Luxembourg to 480 percent in Italy.  Variation in coverage appears even wider if we deflate 
coverage limits by per capita deposits instead of pcgdp. 
  Figure 1 expresses 2003 pcgdp in each EU member as a percentage of pcgdp in 
Luxembourg.  Across the EU, variations in individual features correlate -- albeit imperfectly --
with per capita GDP and also with various indices of political competitiveness, bureaucratic 
quality, and government corruption.  Per capita GDP also correlates loosely with the quality of a 
country’s contracting environment (i.e., with the degree of transparency, bonding, and deterrency 
found in private and government contracts).  Where private contracting environments are strong December 5, 2005 
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or government accountability is weak, net marginal benefits from offering extensive government 
guarantees are hard to achieve. 
  With the recent entrance of transitional Eastern European countries into the EU, the 
potential for multinational banking distress seems greater than it was in the relatively benign 
1975-1997 period studied by Hutchinson (2002).  In the event of a threatened regional crisis or 
indeed of insolvency at any multinational bank, one would expect large depositors to work with 
bank personnel to arbitrage cross-country differences in effective coverages.  A large depositor 
could increase statutory coverage for balances by spreading its aggregate claim against the 
conglomerate banking organization across branches and locally incorporated subsidiaries in 
different member countries. Recognizing that the likelihood of a government’s “topping up” 
payouts beyond statutory coverages would grow with a country’s fiscal capacity, such a 
depositor could further strengthen the collectability of its aggregate claim by relocating deposit 
balances from branches and subsidiaries in countries with low tax-collection and debt capacities 
and low coverage limits (such as Hungary) to countries with stronger tax-collection and debt 
capacities and very high coverage limits (such as France and Italy).   
Unlike traditional deposit runs which simply remove funds from a troubled institution, 
protective deposit rebooking could preserve the liquidity and risk-taking capacity of the 
consolidated organization while generating capricious pressure on individual countries’ balance 
of payments and deposit-insurance liabilities.  Within the European Monetary Union, exchange-
rate adjustments could not occur, so that interbank loans and adjustments in income and 
employment would have to perform the necessary equilibrations. However, for countries outside 
the monetary union, an intrabank deposit run could also affect foreign-exchange rates, so that the 
mix of currency, income, and employment adjustments would depend on whether and how the December 5, 2005 
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affected institution is able to borrow from foreign banks and how it elects to manage its resulting 
exposure to currency risks. 
 
IV. Regulatory Arbitrage and Regulatory Competition 
  Within and across countries, the services performed by financial institutions and financial 
safety nets are jointly determined.  The size and distribution of the net social benefits or costs 
produced by regulatory services vary substantially from country to country.  This variation fuels 
interactive process of regulatory arbitrage and regulatory competition (Kane, 1981). An 
aggressive regulator can increase its budget and prestige by enhancing the quality and reliability 
of important services its regulatees offer to customers. In turn, aggressive institutions can modify 
the form and location of their services to extract taxpayer-financed net benefits from individual-
country safety nets. 
  When the value of a deposit insurer’s implicit and explicit guarantees of client- 
institutions obligations exceeds the fees and implicit costs the insurer imposes on them, its 
system offers regulatory clients a net regulatory benefit.  In the (seldom observed) reverse case, 
the insurance system would generate a net burden.  Regulatory arbitrage occurs when differences 
in effective burdens and benefits induce institutions to adjust their organizational form to book 
particular balance-sheet positions in jurisdictions that treat these categories of deal-making most 
favorably.  Because financial deals and services may be conceived and executed in locations 
different from those in which profits and costs formally accrue, the simplest form of regulatory 
arbitrage consists of introducing into a firm’s organization chart a “booking division” whose job 
it is to restructure the institution’s deal-making contracts and services-delivery mechanisms so 
that its revenues and costs are allocated across nations in an advantageous fashion. December 5, 2005 
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  As a straightforward example, let’s suppose that country A levies semiannual deposit-
insurance premiums on deposit balances in banking offices located within its borders on March 
31 and September 30, while premiums in Z are based on June 30 and December 31 amounts. On 
each country’s assessment date, it would pay the booking division of every bank that accepted 
deposits in both countries to shuffle at least some of the balances of its multinational customers 
to offices in the other country.  
 
In most regulatory cultures, a multinational bank’s booking division imposes more 
competitive discipline on country-level regulators than taxpayers can.  A high-burden regulator 
loses budget revenue, clients, bureaucratic rents, and prestige, but market forces can seldom 
force a poorly performing regulator to shut down.  Its continued existence is supported by 
incentive defects in public-service contracting and information exchange between government 
regulators and taxpayer-suppliers of their risk capital.  At best, governments are prepared to shift 
the functions of a poorly performing regulator into a new agency.  Although losses generate 
political and bureaucratic pressures on enfeebled regulators to rebuild their market share, the 
curtailment of exit pressure lessens the incentive for incumbent politicians and regulators to 
respond to regulatory arbitrage by increasing the efficiency of their system.  They may attempt 
instead—or as well—to form cross-country regulatory cartels and to curtail industry criticism 
during their watch by offering client constituencies hard-to-observe increases in supervisory and 
regulatory subsidies (see, for example, Hoshi, 2002).  The more difficult it is for the press to 
uncover and report the costs that responses of this kind impose on taxpayers, the longer it takes 
disadvantaged parties to assemble enough lobbying counterpressure to hold regulators 
accountable for these costs.  This is why the speed and extent to which regulatory competition December 5, 2005 
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leads to better regulation on average varies with the quality of the performance reporting and 
cultural norms a given regulatory culture entails.   
 
V. Consolidating versus Trading Individual-Country Exposures 
  Completely autonomous national deposit-insurance systems pose two problems of 
coordination.  The first comes from the difficulty of identifying and mending destabilizing 
elements in individual-country loss-control systems before they can harm other countries.  The 
second is the absence of contractual mechanisms for an adversely affected country to discipline 
authorities in a problem country or even to hedge straightforwardly whatever cross-country risk 
exposures it might face. 
  For countries that have adopted a common currency, it seems natural to address these 
coordination problems by consolidating deposit-insurance management (Schoenmaker and 
Osterloo, 2004).  To see the problems in this alleged solution, it is helpful to envision a 
consolidated deposit insurer as a centrally managed holding company whose managers would 
more or less tightly oversee insurance subsidiaries operating in individual countries. The 
principal tasks of the holding company would be to measure, manage, and fund cross-country 
risk, including the risk of a contagious transmission of financial-crisis pressures from one 
country to another.  However, the central office would have to respect differences in regulatory 
culture.  The extent of these differences and their resistance to rapid change would limit how fast 
and how extensively consolidation could proceed. 
  Public-choice theory presumes that public officials can more easily create standards and 
enforcement schemes that internalize externalities within a country or particular “regulatory 
culture” than across countries or cultures.  Diversity in societal norms, the uneven pace of December 5, 2005 
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financial change, and the length of individual-country and cross-country regulatory lags make 
differences in adaptive capacity the central issue in coordinating banking supervision.  
Although instructive parallels exist between the potential consolidation of modern 
European deposit-insurance enterprises and the U.S. transition from state-level to federal deposit 
insurance, the parallel falls short in three ways.  First, although state systems were government-
created and government-supervised, they were funded entirely from client premiums.  Second, 
none of these systems was still in operation when cross-state consolidation was negotiated.  This 
simplified the turf issues that negotiators faced.  Third, the design of the consolidated enterprise 
was worked out in a democratically elected national legislature, subject to a system of fully 
seasoned checks and balances from judiciary and executive branches of government. 
In the EU today, cross-country cooperation to lessen externalities has to be negotiated on 
an ad hoc basis in European Union committees and ministries.  The formulation and subsequent 
enforceability of any multinational agreement that might emerge would be weakened by holes in 
still-evolving checks and balances and by divergences in individual-country cultural norms, 
differences in market and political structures, and variation in exposures to economic stress. 
As implicit guarantors of catastrophic losses, taxpayers in individual EU countries 
resemble poorly informed corporate shareholders.  Taxpayers’ inability either to observe their 
implicit loss exposure or to extract appropriate compensation leaves them vulnerable to 
exploitation by consolidated and individual-country regulators.  A norm of nationalism is 
enshrined in every regulatory culture.  This norm distorts accountability for multinational losses 
and undermines efforts either to empower or to oblige a consolidated supervisor or its country-
level subsidiaries to minimize the aggregate costs of incentive conflict. December 5, 2005 
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To manage externalities within the European Union, supranational managers could 
eschew direct supervision and simply trade the functional equivalent of reinsurance contracts 
informally within an intrafirm “capital market.”  However, information asymmetries and 
incentive conflicts within the opaque intercorporate network would still degrade the adjustment 
process.  Only in a perfect world could beneficent regulators in individual countries and the 
taxpayer-principals they serve always know what coordinated adjustments in safety-net 
parameters would maximize world or regional welfare and proceed to make these adjustments 
promptly.  In the real world, the alleged optimality of proposed adjustments is always contested 
and regulators’ incentives to undertake desirable adjustments are distorted by information lags, 
nationalistic biases, variation in empowerments and reporting responsibilities, legal systems, and 
cultural norms. 
Once politicians were presented with strong evidence that cross-country deposit churning 
had contributed to an observed crisis, it is likely that the cause of rapid safety-net consolidation 
would win important new adherents.  However, waiting for unpleasant evidence to develop 
seems a poor way to address the externalities involved. 
The rest of this paper argues that conflicts of interest between national deposit insurers 
and domestic and foreign taxpayers could be lessened and economic efficiency increased if the 
transparency and deterrency of country-level deposit-insurance loss exposures could be 
enhanced.  To do this without multinational negotiations, individual-country authorities could 
merely acquiesce in providing new and market-driven ways to measure and fund their particular 
safety-net risk exposures.  Kane (2003) suggests that this could be done by organizing public 
markets in deposit insurers’ debt and reinsurance derivatives. Trading contracts that reinsure 
designated shares (“tranches”) of observable disbursements made in resolving bank insolvencies December 5, 2005 
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within specified windows of time would allow governments to smooth their expenses over the 
business cycle and to transfer selected deposit-insurance risks both to one another and to private 
counterparties.  Unlike intercorporate risk transfers, public trading in reinsurance contracts 
would be transparent and could even be routed through an organized exchange.  Prices 
established in debt and derivatives markets would disclose traders’ consensus estimates of 
changing national loss exposures and do so without making any government cede politically 
sensitive monitoring, policing, or closure powers to a supranational entity. 
 
VI. Value of Conceiving of Deposit-Insurance Contracts as Tradable Credit Derivatives 
  A government deposit-insurance guarantee (DIG) corresponds to one side of a plain-
vanilla credit default swap (CDS) supporting a designated first-loss exposures in underlying 
deposit instruments.  Every CDS transfers the default-risk exposure to  one or more named 
borrowers (here, insured banks) from a protection receiver (here, a depositor) to a third party that 
is willing and able to bear this exposure (here, the deposit insurer).  In deposit insurance, the 
original protection seller has the statutory right and duty to supervise proactively the institutions 
whose deposits it covers.  The better this protection seller can carry out its supervisory 
responsibilities, the less risk exposure it and its counterparties actually share. 
  In return for covering the default risk in the protection receiver’s long position in the 
underlying instrument, the DIG protection seller receives contractually defined intervention 
rights and collects a periodic fee from each bank it guarantees.  In a fully competitive 
equilibrium, the insurer’s loss-control system would be Pareto-optimal and the fee would cover 
the sum of the costs (C) of the protection seller’s supervisory and portfolio activity and the 
market value of the risk exposure it assumes (R).  If the loss-control system were imperfect but December 5, 2005 
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costless to operate, the premium would equal R.  If a country’s loss-control system were both 
perfect and costless, the equilibrium R and periodic premium would be zero.   
  Although deposit insurance also resembles a casualty insurance policy (CIP), the 
correspondence breaks down in one important respect.  Deposit insurance and CIP are alike in 
that: 
•  Payouts are triggered by a well-defined loss-causing event; 
•  One party is designated as providing (i.e., selling) “protection against the covered event;” 
•  The party literally “buying protection” (here, the bank on behalf of the depositor) pays a 
fee to the protection seller on a periodic basis as long as the coverage exists; 
•  The contract stipulates how the loss associated with an insured event will be measured 
and how soon claims for damage will be paid; 
•  The protection buyer must have an “insurable position” (i.e., hold a long position in the 
covered asset). 
  The critical difference between a CIP and a government-issued deposit-insurance contract 
is that the insured party in a CIP has an obligation to prove the size of its loss using professional 
appraisers and the insurer has both a right and a duty to challenge the proffered proof.  The 
resulting negotiation process is called “loss adjustment.”  Both in deposit insurance and in credit 
swaps, the value of the protection payment is preadjusted.  Payment is governed by actual price 
movements in the underlying instrument during the days and weeks covered by the contract.  For 
a CDS, the protection payment is determined by the price movement experienced by a “reference 
security” during a specified number of days or weeks following the default event.  In contrast, 
assuming there is no coinsurance or deductible, a DIG pays out the par value of insured deposits 
and the insurer takes control of the insolvent bank.  As receiver, the insurer either sells its December 5, 2005 
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ownership position to another party or it puts the bank’s assets into liquidation.  Whenever a 
failed bank is sold off promptly, the cost of protection is established as the difference between 
the outpayments made to depositors and the net proceeds from the sale.  However, in the event 
the insurer decides to liquidate the bank, the cost of protection remains stochastic and may not be 
known for several years.  For this reason, tradable deposit-insurance derivative contracts might 
specify an operational procedure for valuing and transferring the expected value of proceeds 
from the liquidation.  Alternatively, the protection-supplying side of DIG reinsurance contracts 
could be assigned a tradable claim to the actual cash flows generated during the liquidation. 
  An additional feature of a freely tradable CDS—and, therefore, of tradable deposit-
insurance derivative contracts—is that the protection buyer need not hold a long position in the 
covered asset and the short side need not be empowered to exercise any supervisory functions.  
In a negotiable DIG derivative contract, any party anywhere in the world could take either side 
of the default swap as long as its own credit standing and the contract’s bonding arrangements 
were strong enough to control the risk of counterparty nonperformance and the trader thought it 
could make a profit.  Private parties entering either side of any swap would seek to uncover 
nonpublic information and they would communicate their findings to the market by the trades 
they make. 
As with any other publicly traded instrument, counterparties would buy and sell DIG 
reinsurance contracts either on an organized exchange or through a network of respected, 
government-licensed dealers.  These market makers would accept a first-loss responsibility for 
covering shortfalls in performance by any counterparty to whom they sell a reinsurance contract.  
This responsibility would create incentives for market makers and counterparties to police 
carefully the wealth and character of one another.  December 5, 2005 
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  Of course, projected profits would be conditional on each party’s assessment of: (1) the 
capital and risk exposures of the banks and counterparties that each contract covers, and (2) the 
quality of countries’ systems of safety-net loss control.  Financial analysts could use the prices of 
various derivatives issued directly by a country’s major banks to approximate the value of 
individual-country DIG exposures.  Comparing these hypothetical values with the actual prices 
at which the reinsurance derivatives trade could help DIG officials in individual EU countries to 
identify their cross-country exposures to loss.  Unmasking these risk should encourage officials 
to undertake trades and supervisory actions designed to rein in any exposures that disconcert 
them. 
Every trader that takes either side of a DIG derivative enters into a de facto partnership 
with the insurer of the underlying contract.  Kane, Hickman, and Burger (1993) explain why 
coinsurance and reinsurance partnerships between private and government deposit insurers are 
socially beneficial. Such partnerships allow the government to outsource to private 
counterparties risks and skills in which private parties have a comparative advantage.  The result 
is to integrate the timeliness and greater accountability of private initiatives with the deep-pocket 
back-up protection of individual-country guarantees against catastrophic risk. 
During their lives, each private reinsurance contract would convey a specified tranche of 
the aggregate losses a particular insurer incurred between specified upper and lower limits.  The 
more efficient an insurer’s monitoring, insolvency-resolution, and liquidation efforts, the smaller 
and rarer will be the losses that the reinsurers would expect to bear.  As confidence grows in a 
particular insurer’s loss-control system, the upper limit may be raised (to lessen taxpayer loss 
exposure) and reinsurance shares may be subdivided into finer and finer tranches. 
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VII. Model of Balance-Sheet Management at a Deposit-Insurance Enterprise 
Kane (2003) and Draghi, Giavazzi, and Merton (2003) model a country’s deposit insurer 
as a firm in which taxpayers and insured institutions invest risk capital.  As illustrated in Figure 
1, an insurer’s balance sheet consists of four controllable items: (1) a portfolio of tangible assets 
that constitutes its loss reserves (A); (2) the aggregate value of the intangible net loss exposures 
Li that pass through from its individual client banks (i = 1,…, n); (3) a book of external hedges 
(H); and (4) the value of its risk capital (R).  The value of each Li is defined to be net of the 
“internal” diversification benefits that correlations among the other (n-1) exposures an individual 
insurer’s clients might naturally generate.  This paper extends prior models by investigating how 
each loss exposure varies with the quality (Q) and cost (C) of the insurer’s system for monitoring 
and deterring client risk taking. Another innovation is that Q is portrayed as a function of the 
transparency (T) that the monitoring system generates and the effect of the bonding (B) and 
deterrent restrictions (D) that depositors and the insurer use to restrain bank risk taking. 
If loss exposures are managed efficiently, the economic value of R supports a profile of 
risk from which all diversifiable risk has been removed by booking external hedges until the 
marginal benefit of further hedging transactions equals their marginal hedging cost.  What levels 
of T, B, and D the insurer establishes and how benefits and costs are distributed between 
managers, clients, and taxpayers is a matter of corporate governance.  Accountability for these 
decisions depends on the relative ability of the insurer’s capital-supplying sectors to monitor the 
insurer’s aggregate loss exposure and to influence managerial decisions in a country’s particular 
political and financial-contracting environment. December 5, 2005 
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To manage the portfolio risk a deposit insurer incurs, its staff must measure, price, and 
hedge its loss exposures and calculate an appropriate level of reserves. This risk is managed 
optimally when the marginal costs of all four activities are set equal to their marginal benefits. 
Costless Case. In the simplest case, measurement and portfolio activities are costless and 
risk exposures are known and stationary.  In this case, the insurer would charge each client only 
for operating costs (C) and the undiversifiable risk that client imposed on insurance reserves and 
these charges would allow the insurer to maintain an optimal fund of explicit reserves and 
intangible taxpayer catastrophic support.  Assuming that the loss exposures in an insurer’s client 
base do not cancel out across its country-level client base, the insurer could either hedge its 
idiosyncratic risk in global reinsurance markets or consolidate structurally with other countries’ 
insurers until all diversifiable risk disappeared from the system.  Unless operating costs differed 
in an important way, it would make no difference what combination of hedging and 
consolidation activities management chose to pursue (Kane, 2003). 
Introducing Measurement and Pricing Costs. Realistically, deposit-insurance managers 
must incur positive costs to measure and price their loss exposures. This makes it uneconomic to 
pursue these activities until their marginal benefits are driven to zero.  Also, individual-country 
and global insurers can only estimate their efficient risk-return frontiers. 
When key parameters are both uncertain and nonstationary, information lags and 
bureaucratic restraints on policy response make risk harder to measure and also make 
responsibility for the costs of policy mistakes harder to assign.  Suppliers of deposit-insurance 
capital need to worry about how to hold country-level and relevant multinational officials 
accountable for the tradeoff between the public and private benefits imbedded in the balance-
sheet structure and loss-control system they choose. December 5, 2005 
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Even in a stationary environment, imperfections in information flow support agency costs 
that would be resolved differently under consolidation than under a cross-country hedging 
strategy.  The greater transparency of the costs and discipline generated in hedging particular 
exposures in external reinsurance markets renders them more contractable than the costs of 
operating a cross-country corporate structure and subjecting its managers to a governance system 
strong enough to control incentive conflict in the consolidated enterprise. 
In deposit insurance, the probability of large shocks (so called “jump risk”) is non-
negligible and supervisors must allow for the possibility that large shocks may move across 
countries with greater force than small ones.  The infrequent occurrence of large shocks means 
that policymakers have an insufficient number of observations with which to estimate reliably 
the behavior of cross-country correlation coefficients in crisis circumstances.  Experience 
indicates that correlations among risky assets tend to rise during financial crises (see, e.g., 
Goetzman, Li, and Rouwenhorst, 2005).  This suggests that a country’s pre-existing exposures to 
losses in other countries might lose their diversifying power and increase contagion at critical 
moments.  Even so, public trading of risk exposures by country-level managers would deal better 
with correlation instability because it would generate incentives for quicker and better-informed 
responses by partner countries.  In contrast, managers of a centralized holding company that 
traded country loss exposures only in informationally and politically constrained internal capital 
markets would be much slower to reallocate substantial amounts of risk capital across countries 
when correlations change. 
The key point is that investors in transparent derivatives markets and the top managers of 
a centralized holding company would have different ways of coordinating, verifying, and acting 
on information that is collected at the country level and released by incentive-conflicted agents. December 5, 2005 
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To overcome bureaucratic barriers to the efficient allocation of its risk capital, the multinational 
regulatory holding company would have to establish an information system and a structure of 
implicit and explicit compensation that could induce a high level of truth-telling, promise 
keeping, and fair play both within and across its country-level subsidiaries.  However, in tough 
times, holding-company management would retain the option to decide just what information 
about changing cross-country risk gets reported publicly to capital suppliers in the subsidiary 
countries.  When sudden adverse shocks increase the fragility of important banks in country 
banking systems, the holding company is unlikely to report fully or accurately the spreads at 
which it is clearing different countries’ exposures.  Suppressing such information promises to 
prevent bank runs during each top manager’s particular watch on the bridge, but over longer 
periods it would shift more and more systemic risk onto insurance reserves.  This is because 
hiding the weakness of troubled banks insulates bank managers from healthy depositor discipline 
and encourages them to risk deeper and deeper levels of insolvency in the future.  
Given that information on country-level loss exposures is imperfect, a major advantage of 
competitive trading in deposit-insurance derivatives is that it would provide a way to reward 
private analysts for uncovering information about the size of individual-country loss exposures 
and the quality of regulatory performance.  Although country-level loss exposures are bound to 
vary over the life of any derivatives contract, experience indicates that bureaucrats in individual 
countries are reluctant both to face up to adverse shifts or to publicize them honestly when they 
first recognize them.  Rather than letting incentive-conflicted holding-company executives delay 
the release of information about changes in insolvency risk, derivatives trading would 
immediately disclose changes in the market’s willingness to assume a particular insurer’s loss 
exposures.   December 5, 2005 
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Although our analysis emphasizes cross-country benefits, trading deposit-insurance 
derivatives would improve managerical incentives at any deposit insurer that issued them. 
Movements in the spreads observed for country-level derivatives would generate data on the 
changing value of a country’s exposure to particular layers of loss.  By dissecting and 
reassembling the prices at which DIG derivatives trade, financial analysts could construct and 
disseminate in timely fashion market-based estimates of the value of stakeholder loss exposures. 
Each contract traded would establish an implicit partnership between the insurer, 
reinsurance market-makers, and contractual counterparties.  In contrast to the real options that 
managers retain under current arrangements, each reinsurance partnership would assign private 
loss-bearers a series of well-defined and tradable loss exposures.  Variation in the market price 
established for individual-country contracts would surface new data about the relative 
performance of particular supervisory systems.  Whenever a country-level deposit insurer wanted 
its reinsurance derivative contracts to sell at a lower price, it would only have to formulate, 
disclose, and bond itself to carry out an improved loss-control strategy. 
 
VIII. Summary  
This paper emphasizes that differences in regulatory culture are a largely exogenous 
constraint on the problem of finding and negotiating efficient ways to identify and internalize 
deposit-insurance externalities across countries.  It advances three hypotheses.  First, in the 
absence of crisis, few pairs of national deposit-insurance schemes could readily integrate their 
particular regulatory systems.  Second, divergences in regulatory culture make consolidation an 
unpromising way for deposit insurers in any multinational community to address cross-country 
externalities today.  Third, opening opportunities to trade structured reinsurance derivatives December 5, 2005 
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could improve the efficiency of every deposit insurer that issued them and achieve many of the 
putative benefits of multinational supervisory consolidation without sacrificing the democratic 
accountability inherent in the current system of country-level policymaking. 
Much as protection sellers function in existing credit-swap markets, buyers of the 
reinsurance derivatives proposed here would accept a synthetic position in one or more layers of 
the actual expenses incurred in resolving individual-bank insolvencies in particular countries 
during specified time periods.  Over time, the price a given insurer would pay for successive 
units of protection would vary inversely with the condition of its banks and directly with 
increases in the perceived quality of its loss-control system. 
Differences in the spreads quoted on DIG derivatives for different countries would offer 
irrepressible early-warning signals of the relative weakness and strength of different countries’ 
crisis-prevention and crisis-management systems.  The public nature of these signals and the 
contractual right to offload losses would counter unhealthful political and bureaucratic pressure 
to postpone the treatment of emerging problems. 
The observable benefits of achieving a lower spread would strengthen incentives for 
improving individual-country insurance systems even at times when their loss exposures were 
not surging out of control.  If national stock exchanges or the deposit insurers of major countries 
were to propose and foster trading in DIG derivatives, the desire to improve market spreads 
would encourage policymakers in individual countries to improve their regulatory systems. 
Making movements in spreads observable would also make it easier for empirical researchers to 
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Table 1: Variation in GDP Per Capita, Deposit-Insurance Coverage Limits, and Coinsurance Provisions in European Union Counties, 





limit in 2003 
(in US$) 
GDP per capita 
in 2003 
(in 1999 US$)  
Coverage limit-to-








(in %) in 2002 
Coverage limit-to-
deposits per capita 
in 2002 
Austria   1979  25,260  32,049  0.8  0.7  10  0.9 
Belgium   1974  25,260  29,889  0.8  0.7  10  0.9 
Cyprus   2000  25,260  13,467  2.5  2.2  10  2 
Czech Republic   1994  31,575  5,207  3.6  3.2  10  5.3 
Denmark   1988  40,296  37,500  1.2  1.2  0  2.5 
Estonia   1998  8,058  4,148  0.5  0.4  10  1.4 
Finland   1969  31,863  30,332  0.9  0.9  0  1.9 
France   1980  88,410  29,133  2.7  2.7  0  4.2 
Germany   1966  25,260  31,773  0.8  0.7  10  0.8 
Greece   1993  25,260  12,652  1.5  1.5  0  1.7 
Hungary   1993  14,429  5,136  0.6  0.6  0  1.5 
Ireland   1989  25,260  25,497  0.6  0.5  10  0.8 
Italy   1987  130,457  20,302  4.8  4.8  0  8.7 
Latvia   1998  5,545  2,476  1.4  1.4  0  5.2 
Lithuania   1996  16,293  2,215  3.1  2.8  10*  14.1 
Luxembourg   1989  25,260  53,013  0.4  0.4  10  0.1 
Malta  2003  25,260  9,812  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands  1979  25,260  30,389  0.7  0.7  0  0.7 
Poland  1995  28,418  3,536  3.6  3.5  10*  14.3 
Portugal   1992  31,575  12,499  1.9  1.9  0  2.1 
Slovak Republic  1996  25,260  4,180  2.8  2.8  10  4.8 
Slovenia   2001  26,931  11,160  1.6  1.6  0  3 
Spain   1977  25,260  16,824  1.2  1.2  10  1.4 
Sweden   1996  34,364  30,286  1  1  0  n.a. 




Source: Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2005). 
Notes:   n.a.: not available 
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